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CURRENT LEGISLATION
NEW YORK STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY ACT OF 1951 1
The framers of our Constitution were unaware that in a rela-
tively short period of time that instrument would have to accom-
modate measures designed to perpetuate this nation through an
era in which atomic annihilation could, in a matter of hours, be a
reality.2 Not only the manner of conducting, but indeed the man-
ner of commencing war has been greatly altered with the years.3
Wars no longer follow a formal declaration; a nation may be
plunged into war without forewarning.4 Because a sudden attack
might come with devastating effect on the civilian population, Con-
gress initiated a preparedness program by passing the "Federal
Civil Defense Act of 1950." 5 This Act declared that the "... respon-
sibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several
States and their political subdivisions . .. , 6 Pursuant to this
declaration, New York State undertook a reconsideration of its
Civil Defense Law of 1950.7 Governor Dewey, in his legislative
message, pointed out the need for legislation: "The one thing
of which we can be sure is that the devastation caused by any
modern atomic bomb will require advance preparation of a kind
never before undertaken any place in the world .. .only by spell-
ing out in advance the things which would have to be done and
the powers and duties of your State Government, could martial law
be avoided in the terrible event of such destruction of life and prop-
erty. .. ." The legislature passed the "New York State Defense
Emergency Act of 1951" 8 amidst a storm of protest.9
1 Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 784, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 785,
786, repealing N. Y. ExEc. LAw Art. XVI.2 N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1951, p. 1, col. 8 (second atomic blast by Soviet
revealed) ; see Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States, 140 F. 2d 289, 296
(9th Cir. 1943).
3 See N. Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1945, p. 1, col. 8 (first atomic bomb dropped on
Japan); N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1950, p. 1, col. 8 (President orders hydrogen
bomb built).
4 N. Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1941, p. 1, col. 8. See also Wright, Whet Does
War Existf, 26 Am. J. INT'L L. 362 (1932) ; cf. United States v. Rappeport,
36 F. Supp. 915 (S. D. N. Y.), aff'd, 120 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1941) (by im-
plication); United States v. Cornell, 36 F. Supp. 81 (D. Idaho 1940) (by im-
plication); Freeman, Constitutiontality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L.
Rsv. 40 (1944).
564 STAT. 1245, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 2251-2297 (Supp. 1951).
6 ld. §2251.7 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 690.
8 See note .1 supra. Hereafter referred to as the Act.
9 See N. Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 25, col. 4; March 1, 1951, p. 17, col. 1;
March 7, 1951, p. 30, col. 3; March 22, 1951, p. 30, col. 6.
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In time of dire need it may be the inherent right of a sovereign
to do all that is necessary to protect itself; 10 yet an emergency does
not permit the suspension of certain basic rights." The purpose of
this note is to outline the present Act and determine to what extent
it infringes on basic individual rights.
Scope of the Act
The term "civil defense" is defined to encompass "[a]ll those
activities and measures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the
effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused
by an attack, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions
which would be created by any such attack, and (3) to effectuate
emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities
and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack." 12 Execu-
tion and implementation of these "activities and measures" has been
assigned to the political subdivisions of the state on a county and
city level.
To coordinate and effectuate the civil defense programs of the
local authorities, the Act creates in the executive department a Civil
Defense Commission,1 3 the functions of which are to adopt a com-
prehensive plan for the civil defense of the state; enter into mutual
defense pacts with other states; and to guide and direct local author-
ities in carrying out such programs.14
The directives of the Act do not cease with preparations to obvi-
ate the effect of enemy attack, but integrate the production and re-
sources of the state with "[t] he preparation of the United States and
10 See Saltpetre Case, 12 Coke 13, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1606); The Mayor
of N. Y. v. Lord, 18 Wend. 126 (N. Y. 1837); Russell v. The Mayor of N. Y.,
2 Denio 461 (N. Y. 1845); TnE FEDERALIST, No. 23 (Hamilton). See Fair-
man, The Law of Martial Ride and the National Emergency, 55 HARv. L. REv.
1253 (1942) ; Schwartz, The War Power in Britain and America, 20 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 325, 465 (1945).11Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942); Schecter v. United States, 295
U. S. 495 (1935); Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290
U. S. 398 (1934); see United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 88(1921) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 155 (1919).
22N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AcT § 3(3).
13 Hereafter referred to as the Commission. The Commission consists of:
.. the superintendent of public works, the chairman of the public service
commission, the commissioners of health, education, social welfare, commerce,
agriculture and markets, housing, standards and purchase, the industrial com-
missioner, the chairman of the workmen's compensation board, the director of
the division of veterans affairs, the director of the division of safety, the
superintendent of state police, the chief of staff to the governor, two local
directors to be selected by the governor and one additional member, to be
appointed by the governor. . . ." N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY ACT
§20(1). See N. Y. CONsT. Art. V, §3, "No new departments shall be cre-
ated ... but this shall not prevent the legislature from creating temporary
commissions for special purposes. .. "
14 N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EmERGENCY AcT § 21.
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other nations cooperating with it for defense against attack and for
the conduct of war." 15 The State Defense Council '6 was created
to formulate policy for carrying out these broader purposes of the
bill. The Council acts as a liaison to cooperate with established fed-
eral and sister state agencies, and to incorporate all other agencies of
New York State in the defense effort.17 In pursuance of these ob-
jectives, the Council is empowered to control all other agencies of
the state and require them to act as agencies of the Council.' 8
The Act vests broad and sweeping powers in the governor; he
". may execute or require or provide for the execution of any of
the powers, granted by this act, to any agency or officer, in such
manner as he deems necessary or proper." 19 Furthermore, no pro-
vision of this Act is to be construed as limiting the exercise of powers
otherwise vested in him.20
Powers of the Agencies
The Act's grant of powers, designed "... to meet the extra-
ordinary efforts and dangers of defense and yet to protect until the
last safe instant the freedom of action of every citizen .. ,, 21 is
broadly achieved by a division of its provisions into "attack" and
"pre-attack" categories.22
In order to expedite the work of the state defense agencies,
sweeping powers over rights in private property have been granted
to the Council, Commission and local defense organizations. The
Council in the event of attack, is to ". . . provide for the protection
and preservation of property . . .by the owner or person in control
thereof or otherwise." 23 Rights in private property are, in addi-
tion, subjected to the power of eminent domain delegated to the Com-
mission.24  In the event of an attack, the Commission may ... take,
15 Id. §§ 3(6), 2.
16 Id. § 10. Hereafter referred to as the Council. The Council consists of:
* . the governor, the lieutenant-governor and the attorney-general; the tem-
porary president of the senate, the minority leader of the senate and the
chairman of the senate finance committee; the speaker of the assembly, the
majority leader of the assembly, the minority leader of the assembly and
the chairman of the assembly ways and means committee; the chairman of
the state civil defense commission; and twelve persons to be appointed by the
governor... ." N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EmERGENcY ACT § 11(1).
17 "... [T]he legislature may from time to time assign by law new powers
and functions to departments, officers, boards or commissions, and increase,
modify or diminish their powers and functions." N. Y. CON T. Art. V, § 3.
's N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AcT § 12.
19 Id. § 111.
20 Ibid.
21 Governor Dewey's message recommending enactment, Jan. 8, 1951.2 2 However, "attack" being defined by the Act to mean "actual or imminent"
attack, it is difficult to perceive the line of demarcation between "attack" and
"pre-attack" powers in the light of current international instability and modern
concepts of warfare.2 3N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENcY AcT § 12(15).
24 Id. § 25. That courts will not interfere with a reasonable determination
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use, or destroy any and all real or personal property, or any interest
therein, necessary or proper for the purposes of civil defense.. ." 25
and may authorize county or city agencies to do the same.26 Ade-
quate compensation is provided for in the case of such a taking.27
In the event of attack, all "... transportation and communication
facilities and public utilities .. " shall come under the direct control
of the county and city organizations. 28
To insure that the people of the state receive an adequate supply
of food, clothing, fuel and other essential materials during the emer-
gency, the Council is directed to "[a] dopt and make effective ration-
ing, freezing, price-fixing, allocation or other orders or regulations
imposed by the authority of the federal government in aid of the
defense effort .... ,, 29 A similar provision was in effect during the
last war.30 -lowever, this Act goes further than its predecessor in
that it allows the Council to prescribe such measures of its own,
effective for a ninety-day period, without regard to federal action.81
Production and labor are brought within the scope of the Act
in an attempt to enlist all of the state's potential in the defense effort.
The Council is to establish programs encouraging maximum and effi-
cient production,32 and in such vein can authorize the conduct of
business or manufacture of goods on Sundays or legal holidays when
requested by federal authorities or when such action would be in the
interests of public welfare.33 The Secretary of State can extend or
restrict the hours of public business and public employees.8 4
The greatest concession to the expediency of maximum produc-
tion is evidenced in a grant of authority to the Industrial Commis-
sioner. He is authorized during the defense emergency, to grant em-
ployers engaged in defense work dispensations from state labor laws,3 5
of a board, officer, or corporation vested with the power of eminent domain
that an appropriation is necessary, see People v. Fisher, 190 N. Y. 468, 83
N. E. 482 (1908).
25 N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY ACT § 25(1).
26 Id § 25 (2).27 1Id. §25(3).28 Id. § 25 (2) (b).
29 Id. § 12(13). "No act shall be passed which shall provide that any ex-
isting law, or any part thereof, shall be made or deemed a part of said act,
or which shall enact that any existing law, or part thereof, shall be applicable,
except by inserting it in such act." N. Y. CoNsT. Art. III, § 16. See Matter
of Mosner v. Haddock 181 Misc. 486, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 343 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mner., 268 App. Div. 752, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 802 (1st Dep't 1944); Butter & Egg
Merchants Ass'n v. LaGuardia, 181 Misc. 889, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (Sup. Ct.
1944) (holding that legislation similar to Section 12(13) of the N. Y. STATE
DEFENSE EMERGENCY Acr is not in violation of the State Constitution).
30 Laws of N. Y. 1942, c. 445, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1942, c. 544,
Laws of N. Y. 1943, c. 196, § 1, Laws of N. Y. 1944, c. 412, § 2; repealed
by Laws of N. Y. 1946, c. 445, § 1.3 
'N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AcT § 12(14).
32 Id. § 12(8).
33 Id. § 12(9).34 Id. § 40(5).
35 Id. §71.
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where the employer alleges and proves that under the existing labor
conditions he cannot maintain efficient maximum production." Such
dispensations are effective for six months and can be extended only
after another hearing.3 7 No dispensation can be granted affecting
minors under sixteen years of age.38 Parties aggrieved by any ruling
of the Commissioner may appeal.3 9 The Board of Standards and
Appeals is granted a dispensing power with regard to public works
related to the defense effort. 40 It is to be noted that a subsequent
section assures that no dispensation shall be deemed to impair or pre-
vent the right of labor to carry on lawful collective bargaining.41
Financial institutions were not left beyond the pale of this seem-
ingly all-inclusive act. In the event of attack, the Council is to pro-
tect and maintain banking deposits, the banking structure, the busi-
ness of insurance and the interest of policy holders and beneficiaries.42
The legislation does not specify the manner in which this is to be
accomplished.
Personal liberty has been limited by these emergency measures
in an unprecedented exercise of sovereign power. The local author-
ities in the, event of, or in anticipation of, attack, may compel the
evacuation of any person from his home if his remaining therein
would endanger his safety or that of others.43 They may also im-
press into service any person who may be necessary to carry out any
and all of the duties of the localities in counteracting the immediate
effects of an attack.44
This form of enforced service is only to be exercised in the in-
stance of immediate emergency.45 The authorization for temporary
impressment would not adequately provide sufficient defense person-
nel should voluntary enlistments fail to fill approved quotas. Neither
could the authority of the Council and Commission to reassign any
state employee to civil defense work effectively meet manpower de-
ficiencies without seriously hampering governmental processes. 46
Noting these limitations, and confronted with a general public apathy
to the exigencies of civil defense, the legislature deemed itself obli-
gated to include a conscription provision in the Act. Under this sec-
tion, each county or city, when authorized by the Council may con-
script persons to perform the duties imposed upon the counties and
36 Id. § 73 (d).
3 7 Id. § 73(b).
3 8 Id. § 73 (a).3 9
Id. §75.4 0 Id. § 72. See N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 17, "No laborer, workman or
mechanic, in the employ of a contractor or subcontractor engaged in the per-
formance of any public work, shall be permitted to work more than five days
in any week, except in cases of extraordinary emergency...4 1 N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EERGENcY Acr § 86.
42Id. § 12(16).
431d. §25(2) (a).4 4 1d. § 25 (2) (c).
45 Ibid.46 Id. §§ 12 (6), 25 (1) (b).
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cities by the Act.47 The regulations of the Council pursuant to this
section are to be on a ". . . fair and impartial basis by age, training,
occupation, ability or such other classification as the council finds
appropriate and shall specify any exceptions to such classifications
in connection with physical condition, family needs, callings, voca-
tions or professions which must be followed or performed during or
after attack, unusual occupational demands, or similar matters." 48
Constitutionality
Many serious constitutional problems have arisen with the en-
actment of this legislation for which no exact precedent can be found.
The problem of survival under the existing potential danger is new
to the citizenry of the state.
A review of the constitutional questions that may arise under
the Act will be made with particular reference to the conscription
provision. The power of the Council to authorize conscription is
exercisable today under the enabling provision of the Act.49 Since
this power to restrain the right of liberty of person may be exercised
now as distinguished from the exercise of other drastic powers only
in the event of attack, it is deemed that a determination of its validity
would virtually validate the entire Act.
Procedural Due Process
The conscription section of the Act omits provisions for, or
mention of, any notice and hearing. Although the state government
possesses certain residual sovereign powers, it is limited in the ex-
ercise thereof by both the Federal and State Constitutions.8 Both
instruments prohibit denial of liberty "... without due process of
law ."., 51
The concept of procedural due process may vary with the cir-
cumstances; however, certain requirements are deemed fundamental.
Certain accepted concepts of due process, such as the right to appeal,
have been held not to be essential, provided that due process has al-
47 Id. §26.
48 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
4 9 N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AcT § 26(2). For quotas established
and met in New York City, see First Year Report of the Director of Civil
Defense, City of New York (1951).
5o That a state constitution is not a grant, but a limitation on legislative
power, so that the legislature may enact any law not expressly or inferentially
prohibited in the constitution of the state or nation, see Racine v. Morris, 201
N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864 (1911); Matter of Ahern v. Elder, 195 N. Y. 493,
88 N. E. 1059 (1909).
51 U. S. CoNsr. AMENDS. V, XIV; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6. As to the
influence of the Supreme Court's interpretation of due process on state courts,
see Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937)
Franklin v. State, 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295 (1936).
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ready been accorded in the tribunal of first instance. 5 2 In the words
of Justice Brandeis, "The first distinction is between issues of law
and issues of fact. When dealing with constitutional rights (as dis-
tinguished from privileges accorded by the Government) there must
be the opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding, at
some time, to some court, every question of law raised, whatever the
nature of the right invoked or the status of him who claims it. The
second distinction is between the right to liberty of person and other
constitutional rights. . . . A citizen who claims that his liberty is
being infringed is entitled, upon habeas corpus to the opportunity of
a judicial determination of the facts. And, so highly is this liberty
prized, that the opportunity must be accorded to any resident of the
United States who claims to be a citizen. . . . But a multitude of
decisions tells us that when dealing with property a much more lib-
eral rule applies." 53
The notice and opportunity to be heard must be provided for as
a matter of right, not of grace. 54 In any proceeding which is to be
accorded finality, the required notice must be reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.5
With special reference to administrative tribunals, the right to oral
argument is generally accorded; however, such right is not absolute,
but varies with the circumstances as presented by the record. 6
A strong position was taken in the case of Stuart v. Palmer 57
regarding the requirement of a statute to provide for notice and hear-
ing. A statute was enacted in New York authorizing officials to
take, assess and improve certain lands by construction of a highway.
Concededly, the assessment was fairly apportioned. However, the
statute omitted mention of notice and hearing. The Court of Ap-
peals said that, regardless of whether notice was actually given, the
statute itself must provide for such notice and hearing. The omis-
sion of such provision, therefore, was fatal-the statute was held un-
constitutional. In the language of the court, "The legislature may
prescribe the kind of notice and the mode in which it may be given,
but it cannot dispense with all notice." 58
The sole object of construction is to determine the legislative
intent which must be found primarily in the language of the statute
52Ohio ex reL Bryant v. Akron Park District, 281 U. S. 74 (1930).
53 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 77 (1936)(concurring opinion) (cases omitted).
54 Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413 (1915).
55Milliken v. Meyer, Administratrix, 311 U. S. 457 (1940) ; Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914); Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U. S. 604 (1914)
Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900).
-6 Federal Communications Commission v. Station WJR, 337 U. S. 265
(1949); Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481 (1936); Londoner v.
Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
57 74 N. Y. 183 (1878).
r,8 Id. at 188.
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itself.59 Adequate provision has been made to preserve the rudi-
mentary requirements of procedural due process in other sections of
the Act, such as those pertaining to dispensations from the labor
laws. 0 The conscription section of the Act omits specific provision
for, or indeed, mention of, any notice and hearing. Although courts
have at times implied such provision where the language of the stat-
ute permitted, 61 the language of the conscription section does not give
rise to such implication.
It would seem that so basic a right as liberty of person has been
treated in all too cursory a manner by the legislature in omitting ade-
quate provision for notice and hearing. Should the establishment of
proper safeguards be left to a promulgation of the Council in light of
Stuart v. Palmer? 62
Involuntary Servitude and Eminent Domain
When a sovereign is faced with an emergency it may call upon
its citizenry to obviate the danger. It may be stated generally that
the duty owed to the sovereign will vary with the degree, proximity
and duration of the danger.n It would appear that government may,
in addition, compel its citizens to train in preparation for performance
of a potential duty. The power of the state to conscript persons into
the civil defense forces, a statutory product of this century, may be
considered in pari materia with other statutory duties possessing a
wealth of historical background.
A New York statute enables a law officer to command the aid
of any person (without distinction being made for sex) in executing
a legal process, making arrest or retaking a person escaped from
legal custody.64 Refusal or willful neglect to obey such command
is punishable as a misdemeanor. 65 Provision is made for compensa-
1
59 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470 (1916); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 (1892).
60 N. Y. STATE DFENSE EMERGENcY AcT §§ 74, 75.
61 See People ex rel. Morriale v. Branham, 219 N. Y. 312, 52 N. E. 2d 881
(1943) (statute authorizing detention of "mental defectives" after expiration
of their penal sentence upon order of a judge of a court of record, although
not containing provision for notice, was held valid because need for a judicial
determination of the facts implied the necessity for notice). See also Trout-
man v. State, 273 App. Div. 619, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 709 (3d Dep't 1948).
62 74 N. Y. 183 (1878). This case which deals with mere (by comparison)
property rights has been cited consistently and has never been overruled.
63 "When the Italians invaded Abyssinia the following mobilization order
was promulgated by Emperor Haile Selassie: 'When this order is received,
all men and all boys able to carry a spear will go to Addis Ababa. Every
married man will bring his wife to cook and wash for him. Every unmarried
man will bring any unmarried woman he can find to wash and cook for him.
Women with babies, the blind, and those too aged to carry a spear are ex-
cused. Anyone found at home after receiving this order will be hanged.'"
From an address by Admiral Harold R. Stark before the U. S. Chamber of
Commerce, Txa READER'S DIGEST, p. 97 (June 1944).
64 N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 169.
65 N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1848.
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tion to the assisting civilian in the event of injury. The historical
antecedent of this duty dates to the year 1285 and the Statute of
Winchester.6 6 Not only did that statute compel a citizen's assistance
in making arrests, but imposed a duty to maintain and provide "... an
Hauberke, a Breastplate of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and a Horse."
In like manner, the militia concept may be considered in relation
to the conscription provision. Inquiry as to the origin of the duty
of "soldier in time of war--civilian in time of peace"-is answered in
the annals of early English history. 7 This concept at one time was
considered a firmly established obligation of the people to band them-
selves in groups, drill, and keep arms. With the passage of time it
was transformed so that the king could exact such duty from his
subjects.
Debates at the drafting of our Constitution indicated the fear
colonists had in regard to a large standing army.68 This fear was a
motivating factor in securing to the several states a continuation of
the militia system. 60 As a consequence, the Constitution of the State
of New York:70 specifically provides that all able-bodied men within
a certain age group should constitute the militia of the state.71 Legis-
lation in pursuance of this article details the entire militia system of
the state, from the available pool of manpower to the training of
organized units. Provision is made that under certain conditions 72
personnel may be drafted into the organized drill units when the ranks
are undermanned, although the militia had not been called into ac-
tual service. The refusal of a person to submit to such draft is
punishable as a misdemeanor.73  Militiamen are compensated when
their services are required to continue for a period exceeding one
day.74
Other duties owed to the state of a similar sporadic nature in
regard to the occasion and duration of service, have been contested
in the courts unsuccessfully under the Thirteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude.75 In the Selective Draft Law
Cases,76 the Supreme Court dismissed the assertion of involuntary
servitude, refusing to dignify it with a reply by saying, "... . we are
constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is
" 13 EDw. I.
67 1 BL Comm. 409-414 (Jones' ed. 1916); Ansell, Legal and Historical
Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALm L. J. 471 (1917).
68 See Ansell, supra note 67.
69AMrICLES OF CoNFwE1ATioN Art. VI, § 4; U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. II.
70 Art. XII; see Conway, A State's Power of Defense Under the Constitu-
tion, 11 FoRD. L. REv. 169 (1942).71 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 825, § 2, as amended, Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 16,§ 2.
72 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c 825 § 2; Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 16, § 4.
73 Laws of N. Y. 1950, c. 825, § 2.
74 N. Y. MILITARY LAW § 210.
75 See Note, 47 COL. L. REv. 299 (1947).
76245 U. S. 366 (1918).
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refuted by its mere statement." 77 The state may exact the labor
of its citizens to maintain public roads for specified periods each year
without compensation. 78 "Jury service is not a matter of choice or
right, but is a duty, imposed by the state. . . . in the absence of
statute, compensation cannot be recovered." 79 The Supreme Court,
early in the history of the Thirteenth Amendment delimited its pro-
hibition to factual circumstances approaching African slavery and
forms of peonage.80
The duty imposed upon persons in this state under the conscrip-
tion provision of the Act, if viewed in the light of what is possible
under the statute,81 is one of paramount degree. Unlike the afore-
mentioned duties, it is one that has to be evaluated in terms of its
duration and the proximity of public danger.
Under such a maximum approach to this legislation, any person
(no qualifying provision is made in the statute for sex or age) can
be compelled to work an unlimited period of time each day for the
foreseeable future without compensation. Certainly the imposition
of this duty merits close inspection. It is entirely possible in a hypo-
thetical situation to deprive a person of the right to pursue his call-
ing, to restrain his liberty, and to detail him to service for an inde-
terminate period of time without payment or sustenance. Indeed,
the contention has been advanced in a recent case 8 2 by a disabled
war veteran that his body was private property owned by him and
such being true, it fell within the purview of that portion of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution which provides, ". .. nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
It is submitted that the petitioner's novel theory did not receive ade-
quate consideration by the court. That case is distinguishable from
any action that may arise under the hypothetical problem in a maxi-
mum approach to this statute. A soldier receives food, clothing and
shelter. No provision is made in this Act to provide a civil defense
draftee with mere sustenance. There is much dicta to the effect that
a soldier need not be reimbursed for his service.8 3 The practice has
been otherwise. Perhaps, the power of eminent domain is not ap-
plicable to the taking of a person's body. But can the legislature,
under our form of government, extend the period of compelled ser-
vice to be rendered without compensation or sustenance, to a point
77 Id. at 390.
78 Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916).
79 Maricopa County v. Corp., 44 Ariz. 506, 39 P. 2d 351, 352 (1934).8o See Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328, 332 (1916).81 People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 129
N. E. 202 (1920), rearguinent denied, 231 N. Y. 516, 132 N. E. 870, cert.
denied, 256 U. S. 702 (1921).
82 Commers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mont.), aff'd, 159 F. 2d
248 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 331 U. S. 807 (1947).
83 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 29 (1905) ; United States
ex rel. Zucker v. Osborne, 54 F. Supp. 984, 987 (W. D. N. Y. 1944), aff'd,
147 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 881 (1945).
[ VOL. 26
CURRENT LEGISLATION
where a person's livelihood is endangered? Mere statement of this
possibility seems to refute its validity. In the failure of the conscrip-
tion provision to delimit the service that may be exacted of its citi-
zens without compensation, it is more drastic than any other duty
that has been previously imposed by a state on its citizens.
The economic repercussions resulting from the denial to a wage
earner of the opportunity to seek remunerative employment cannot
be estimated. No provision having been made in the Act to com-
pensate these civil defense workers, it is no answer that they may
be subsequently reimbursed. The State Constitution specifically pro-
hibits the expenditure of funds when no contractual obligation is
entered into for goods or services.8 4
Delegation of Legislative Authority
It may be doubted whether the legislature was competent to
grant such broad discretionary powers to the Council. An objection
of this nature may be founded on the theory that the legislative power
is vested solely in the legislative branch of government and cannot be
effectively delegated by that body.85 In Wayman v. Southard,"8
Chief Justice Marshall pointed out the first exception to this uni-
versal rule, which exception was followed by a series of "disintegrat-
ing erosions" almost obliterating the original principle. Justice
Cardozo's dissent in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,87 calling for
"elasticity of adjustment" in the separation of powers between the
executive and the legislative, has become today's majority opinion.
In upholding the Congressional grant of authority to the Office of
Price Administration, the Court said, "Only if we could say that
there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Adminis-
trator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding
to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we
be justified in overriding its choice of means for its declared pur-
pose. .. ," 88 Whether or not the authority given to the Council to
conscript persons on a "fair and impartial basis" contains the standard
of guidance 89 essential to its validity is to be determined by a reading
84 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 8.85 Loc, OF CiviL GOVERNMENT 141.
86 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (U. S. 1825).
87 293 U. S. 388, 440 (1935).
88 Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 426 (1944).
89 "The delegated power of legislation which has found expression in this
code is not canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is uncon-
fined and vagrant .... Here in effect is a roving commission to inquire into
evils and upon discovery, correct them. . . . This is delegation running riot.
No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer." Justice Cardozo, con-
curring in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551-553(1935). Speculation as to what language will satisfy the court is beyond the
scope of the writer. "Unreasonable restraint of trade" is definite, Nash v.
United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 377 (1913); while "unreasonable rate or
charge" is indefinite, United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89
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of the entire provision with reference to the circumstances under
which it was enacted. Notice should be taken of the words qualify-
ing "fair and impartial" and the necessity of submitting a report of
all action taken under the provision to the legislature.90
Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court has viewed constitutionality of state action
in different lights dependent upon the subject of the legislation and
the resultant effect of such legislation upon guaranteed rights of its
citizens. State statutes presented for review to the Court are ac-
companied by a presumption of constitutionality.91 It will suffice to
say that this presumption may be a gesture by the Court-a device
to enable the Court to sustain the validity of the statute on any con-
ceivable set of facts, where the case comes up on demurrer-or is
possibly used as a procedural device to direct the burden of proof.
92
In the field of economic affairs this presumption is very broad with
regard to substantive due process and state regulation. It may be
stated that if reasonable men will differ as to the wisdom of the legis-
lation, yet the position taken by the legislature is arguable, the Court
will not then interfere. 93 The breadth of such presumption dimin-
ishes, however, when state action enters the sanctuary of civil lib-
erties 94 and may possibly vanish.95  Having particular regard to
freedom of speech, notwithstanding the reasonableness of the legis-
lation, the Court has disregarded the particular factual circumstances,
determined what may possibly be done to infringe this freedom under
the statute and applied the "clear and present danger" test.96 There
has been indicated of late a tendency of the Court to retreat from its
previous policy of upholding state statutes dealing with civil liberties.97
(1921); but "reasonable allowance for salaries" is sufficiently informative,
United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 522, 523 (1941). General terms have
been found sufficient, Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1918);
while detailed language has been considered indefinite, Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 457, 458 (1939); Connally, Comn'r v. General Construction
Co., 269 U. S. 385, 393, 394 (1926). The standard, it would seem, varies con-
siderably with the area of conduct regulated, see United States v. Petrillo,
332 U. S. 1, 6, 7 (1947).
90N. Y. STATE DErzi'sE EmERGENCY Acr § 26.
91 Ogden v. Sanders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827).92 Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261, 285 (1947).
93 Daniel, Att'y Gen'l v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220, 224,
225 (1949) ; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U. S. 525, 536, 537 (1949) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.
379, 400 (1937) ; Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934).
94 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945); Schneider v. State, 308
U. S. 147 (1939).95 See United States v. C.I.O., 335 U. S. 106, 140 (1948) (concurring
opinion) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 165 (1945) (concurring opinion).96 Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951) ; see Note, 25 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 295 (1951).
97 Cminpare Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920), wvith Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943); compare Minersville School District v.
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On this question, justice Stone has said: 98 "There may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth . . ." than when it involves regulatory legislation affecting
commercial transactions.
Assuming that the conscription provision is to be considered
under the broad scope of the presumption in favor of constitutionality
afforded state action in the field of economic affairs, can the reason-
ableness of the restriction imposed upon persons under the hypo-
thetical presented be considered as arguable?
Assuming that the provision is to be considered under a pre-
sumption which has been narrowed in scope, in that the state action
• . . appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution . . . . 99 and a maximum of the statute approach is
used, can its validity be upheld?
It is submitted that the conscription provision as it now stands,
considered from all its facets-the possibility that it may be exercised
today; its -omission of provision for notice and hearing; the broad
and sweeping delegation of legislative authority without sufficient
criteria as to length of service, distinction between sexes, and duties
which may be imposed; its omission of provision for compensation
or sustenance when the duty to serve may prevent the right to earn
a living-raises grave questions of constitutionality.1 00
Recommendations and Conclusions
Constitutionality is not the sole criterion of worthy legislation:
it may conclude the judiciary but it does not necessarily attest to the
wisdom of the law. It is submitted that there is much to improve
in this hastily enacted statute, both in removing doubts as to its
constitutionality and contributing to its feasibility. The Federal Gov-
ernment should assume some role in this process. Indeed, the Con-
stitution commands that "[t] he United States ... shall protect each
of them [the States] against invasion .... . 101 Valid objection may
be raised against the action of Congress in almost abdicating that
duty in favor of the less equipped states.10 2 Imminency of the threat
to our vital security, however, prevents a wait-for-Congress-to-act
Gobotis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), with West Virginia State Bd. of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).
98 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
99 Ibid.
100 "Concededly the Legislature cannot decide the question of emergency and
regulation, free from judicial review ... ." People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259,
268, 186 N. E. 694, 698, aff'd, 291 U. §. 502 (1934).101 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4.
20264 STAT. 1245 (1950), 50 U. S. C. App. §§2251-2297 (Supp. 1951).
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policy. Nor is it any solution to criticize the present Act and advo-
cate its repeal. Immediate protective legislation is of paramount im-
portance. Therefore, instead of merely taking issue with such por-
tions of the Act as are deemed improper, the following recommenda-
tions are advanced in an attempt to avoid the harsher results of the
statute and yet to preserve it as an effective emergency instrument:
(1) Make the existence of an "imminent attack" dependent upon
a declaration of the President of the United States, an official better
informed about the temper of foreign relations than state authorities.
Failing an objective definition of "attack," the very purpose of rele-
gating the more drastic powers of the Act to the "attack" period
might prove meaningless in effect.
(2) Declare that the powers operative in the event of an attack
are to cease at a reasonable time after the termination of such attack
or threat of imminent attack.
(3) Render the power of the Council to authorize business or
labor on Sundays or legal holidays, ". . . when necessary for the
safety and health of the people of the state.. ." available only in the
event of an attack. The federal authorities are competent to cope
with the problem until then.
(4) Restrict the Council's power of rationing, freezing, price-
fixing and allocation to the "attack" period, allowing the federal
regulations to handle the problem until then.'
03
(5) Define more adequately the authority of the Council to
. provide for the protection and preservation of property . . .
by the owner or person in control thereof or otherwise. . . ." and
the duty to protect and maintain the banking and insurance structure,
interests and deposits. A more concrete recommendation cannot be
made in this instance for it is difficult to determine what the legisla-
ture intended by these provisions and only speculation is possible
concerning the regulations that may be promulgated under them. It
may be stated that there are sufficient penal laws to protect against
looting if that is the activity feared.
(6) Provide for adequate compensation to be paid by the state
whenever property is taken or used for defense purposes.10 4 The
103 As to whether the state may regulate an area in which Congress has
acted, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). Contra: Matter of
Mosner v. Haddock, 181 Misc. 486, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 343 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
mere., 268 App. Div. 752, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 802 (1st Dep't 1944) (dependent
upon intent of Congress to occupy entire field). See also Grant, The Scope
and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 CoL. L. Rav. 995 (1934).
104 "Where, in the exercise of emergency powers . . . (a) possession of any
land has been taken on behalf of His Majesty, or (b) any property other than
land has been requisitioned or acquired on behalf of His Majesty, or (c) any
work has been done on any land on behalf of His Majesty, otherwise than by
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injured property owner should not be compelled to discover whether
the property was taken under the authority of the state or his local
government agency and then press his remedy against the acting
party only.10 5 This may be impossible under attack conditions. Nor
should compensation be predicated upon the taking being made under
authorization of the Council or Commission as is required by the
present law. If the property is taken, the owner should have an
immediate right against the state; if it has been taken without au-
thority, the state should have a remedy against the party acting with-
out the scope of his authority.
(7) The conscription provision should be amended in several
respects. Proper notice (at least thirty days) and a hearing with
right of appeal should be granted to a conscripted party.10  Definite
classifications as to persons to be conscripted should be made by the
legislature, not the Council. Authorization by the Council to draft
should provide which classifications should be called up.10 7  Particu-
lar classes of persons should be assigned to appropriate duties
(women should not be firemen). A maximum number of hours of
service per week should be prescribed, with compensation to be paid
for any service beyond that limit. Defense personnel should be in-
cluded within the protection of workmen's compensation laws not
only if they are injured while performing their duties during attack
as at present, 08 but also while undergoing training.10 9 Conscripted
personnel should be discharged as soon as volunteers fill the estab-
lished quotas or when the emergency terminates. Most pressing is
the need to remedy what must have been the neglect of the legis-
lature in failing to impose a specific penalty for violation of the con-
scription section. At present such violation is an infraction." 0  In
order to make this basic provision effective, evasion of directives
way of measures taken to avoid the spreading of the consequences of damage
caused by war operations, then, . . . compensation assessed . . . shall be
paid. . . ." 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 75, § 1(1) (1939). See also 2 & 3 GEo. VI,
c. 31, §§ 2-6 (1939), requiring local authorities to pay compensation to the
owner of property for any damage to the property ensuing from the diminu-
tion of property value or interference with his use of the premises by the con-
struction and maintenance of air raid shelters thereon. Furthermore, the
premises are to be restored to their original state, so far as possible, when its
use as a shelter is no longer required.
1o5 N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY AcT § 25.
o108 See 62 STAT. 618 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 460 (Supp.
1951) (Federal Selective Service Act) for adequate provisions contained
therein.
107 See 62 STAT. 609 (1948), as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 455, 456 (Supp.
1951) (Federal Selective Service Act).108 Laws of N. Y. 1951, c. 788, §§ 302, 303.
109 See 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 31, § 71 (1939), which provides for compensa-
tion to English civil defense workers injured while in training.
"o'N. Y. STATE DEFENSE EMERGENCy AcT § 101(5). Consider the possi-
bility of extradition proceedings against an evader who leaves the state, when
he is only guilty of an infraction.
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promulgated thereunder should be deemed a misdemeanor. Willful
refusal to serve when conscripted should be made a felony.
(8) The governor should be allowed to assume all 'of the duties
and powers of all of the agencies under this Act only when an at-
tack occurs or is imminent.'11
These specific proposals suggest themselves upon the face of the
Act. They are not exclusive. Legislation of this nature, which gives
the power to override all other laws save the Federal Constitution,
statutes and regulations and the State Constitution deserves much
more consideration than has been given to it. The problems which
this bill attempts to solve are the most pressing questions ever pre-
sented in the state's history. There is need for a standing legislative
committee to conduct extensive hearings on the situation to: secure
the advice of recognized technological experts; study the action taken
.by other states and by Great Britain during the last war; invite rem-
edial proposals from military and police officials, firemen, labor
leaders, production heads, bar associations and other strata of our
society who could presumably aid it in formulating improvements in
the present Act. In this manner a deeper understanding of the abso-
lute requisites to an effective defense mobilization could be obtained.
As these requirements become properly defined, the legislature should
use them as a basis for imposing limitations on the current broad
powers of the defense agencies, which would allow them to carry out
their duties effectively, but would at the same time provide the best
protection possible for acknowledged civil liberties." 2
PURCHASER AT MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALE - THE TITLE HE
ACQUIRES-EFFECT OF NEW SECTIONS 500-A, 506-A AND 506-B
OF THE NEW YORK REAL PROPERTY LAW
Introduction
A new amendment to the New York Real Property Law,' which
has become effective September 1 of this year, has affected the mort-
gage foreclosure law of this state to a limited but noteworthy extent.
"I See Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861), and surrounding
history as an illustration of the terrifying results possible from the residence
of so much power in a single official, in that case: President Lincoln.
112 During the last war, England's civil defense regulations were promul-
gated by the King in Council. However, it was mandatory to place all such
regulations before Parliament, which body could void them within forty days.
2 & 3 GEo. V1, c. 31, § 88 (1939).
1 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 500-a, 506-a, 506-b. Added by Laws of N. Y.
1951, c. 610.
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